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Abstract
This research study tests the underinvestment hypothesis and
the liquidity risk hypothesis in the textile sector of Pakistan. A panel
data set of 105 textile companies has been employed over eight  years
extending from 2004-2011. Using 2-Stage Least Square Estimation
procedure (2SLS) and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
the empirical findings  reveal that textile firms in Pakistan use high
level of long term debt to shrink the liquidity risk which allows the
firms to use more debt. Moreover growing firms use less leverage than
the non growing firms when exposed to high growth opportunities.
The growth opportunities exhibited a negative relationship with debt
maturity but no significant economic relationship with leverage. In
the textile sector of Pakistan leverage and short term debt maturity
structure tends to complement each other to hedge the firms against
the liquidity risk.
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Introduction
Myers (1977) asserted that growing firms maintaining high level
of risky debt either do not invest at all or tend to forgo projects
generating positive NPV believing that the return of these projects
would materialize for only the lenders of the company in the form of
fixed finance cost payments. Hence the firms end up with debt overhung
or face a situation of underinvestment problem. This can be treated as
the agency cost of debt overhung. The agency cost of debt overhung
or underinvestment problem emerges from the attitude of the managers
towards the creditors of the company. The tendency of the managers
to limit company investments in order not to give benefit to the creditors
refers to the agency cost of underinvestment problem. As a solution
to the underinvestment problem Myers (1977) proposed two strategies,
1) overall reduced level of leverage or 2) using high level of short term
loans. The motivation behind lowering the debt lies in the fact that it
decreases the underinvestment cost and enables a company to take
up positive NPV projects. On the other hand augmented utilization of
short term borrowings allow the firm to take full benefit of the positive
NPV projects as the short term debt would mature before the completion
of the project. Furthermore the firm can also renegotiate the debt during
the life of the project hence resolving the underinvestment problem.
On the contrary, resolving the underinvestment problem while
using short term loans exposes the firms to increased liquidity risk as
proposed by the liquidity risk hypothesis by Diamond (1991, 1993)
and Sharpe (1991). Therefore incase of exposure to high liquidity risk,
firms avoid using short term debt even during the high growth phases.
This is indicative of a trade off relationship between the liquidity risk
and underinvestment problem. If the underinvestment hypothesis
treats debt maturity and leverage as strategic substitutes to resolve
the problem then according to the liquidity risk hypothesis, debt
maturity and leverage strive to complement each other in order to
moderate the liquidity risk. When the firms use long term debt their
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liquidity risk is low hence these firms can easily increase the level of
debt.
On the basis of the contrasting views proposed by the liquidity
risk and underinvestment hypotheses, the objective of this paper is
to test both of these hypotheses in the textile sector of Pakistan. In
pursuit of analyzing the intermingled connection between debt maturity
and leverage in the presence of growth opportunities, this study
strives to answer the following questions.
· How are the firm’s financing decisions affected by the
underinvestment problem? Are the firm’s financing decisions
constrained by the possible liquidity risk?
· Are leverage and short term debt maturity structures
substitutes of each other for resolving the underinvestment
problem?
· Do leverage and debt maturity complement each other in
moderating liquidity risk?
· Does shortening the debt maturity help in attenuating the
negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage?
· Does the initial decision to use low leverage help in
attenuating effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity?
Using a panel data setting, empirical findings have been generated
through the application of two estimation procedures including 2SLS
and the GMM. This study has been further outlined as follows. In the
section 2, past literature pertaining to the possible interaction between
debt maturity and leverage in the presence of growth opportunities
has been discussed. Section 3 elaborates the research hypotheses
designed to test the interaction between leverage, debt maturity and
growth opportunities. Section 4 provides details of the methodology
adopted in this study. Section 5 provides a discussion on the empirical
results of the study. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
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Literature Review
Myers (1977) in his underinvestment hypothesis proposed that
the growing firms str ive to deal with the agency cost of
underinvestment problem either through reducing leverage or using
short term debt. Hence Myers (1977) regard short term debt and
leverage as strategic substitutes to resolve the underinvestment issue.
Under this substitution effect it is argued that when the growing firms
use short term debt to resolve agency conflict of debt overhung or
underinvestment issue, then these firms are less inclined towards
minimizing the level of leverage. Alternatively when firms use less
leverage to alleviate the agency problem related todebt overhung,
then these firms are less inclined towards using short term debt (Jensen
&Meckling, 1976).
In this setting of agency costs and conflicts, Myers (1977)
contends that a solution to the debt overhung issue is lowering
leverage and also argues for a negative relationship between growth
opportunities and leverage. This argument of negative relationship is
further supported and is in agreement with the results of Frank and
Goyal (2007, 2009) and also with those of Rajan and Zingales (1995).
The alternative means for controlling underinvestment problem
proposed by Myers (1977) is shortening the debt maturity structure in
the financing strategy of a firm. This argument is also supported in
the literature by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996)
through using single equation setting. Overall a conclusive view on
underinvestment hypothesis reveals that the growing firms either use
low leverage or short term debt in order to mitigate a situation of debt
overhung (underinvestment problem).
However Diamond (1991, 1993) argued in his work that the
increased use of short term debt exposes a firm to liquidity risk. He
further argued that firms tend to employ long term debt which reduces
its liquidity risk and allows a firm to use more debt. Hence according
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to the liquidity risk proposition long term debt maturity and leverage
tend to complement each other in moderating the liquidity risk of a
firm. Here on the basis of a literature it can also be inferred that the
use of short term debt has a dual effect, on the one hand it resolves
the underinvestment problem and on the other hand it increases
liquidity risk. Therefore a firm’s financing decisions depends upon a
tradeoff between underinvestment cost and liquidity risk proposition.
In this regard, Mauer and Otts (1998) indicated that firms can
jointly treat underinvestment problem and liquidity risk through using
short term debt with low leverage level simultaneously. Such a
financing strategy is normally employed by those firms for which
liquidity problem is quite aggravated in the form of reduced financial
liquidity and difficulty in acquiring external debt. Moreover in an
attempt to study, Myers’s (1977) underinvestment proposition and
Diamond’s (1991, 1993) proposition simultaneously, Johnson (2003)
provided an interesting set of arguments. Johnson (2003) argued that
a firm’s decision pertaining to the choice of capital structure and debt
maturity structure is significantly affected by a tradeoff between
agency costs and liquidity costs.
Single equation models have been frequently employed in the
literature striving to explain a unidirectional relationship between debt
maturity structure and leverage (Ozkan, 2001, 2002; Guedes&Opler,
1996). The literature suggests that firms either use short term debt or
low leverage to resolve underinvestment problem (Rajan&Zingales,
1995; Barclay & Smith, 1995).
A discussion on the joint selection of short/long term debt and
the level of debt has been initiated by Johnson (2003). According to
Johnson (2003) if a firm chooses to mitigate the underinvestment
problem using short term debt then there is very little motivation left
for a firm to reduce leverage. Hence in such a situation, the proposed
negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities
must vanish (Johnson, 2003). Here the question arises whether a low
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leverage strategy attempts to moderate the negative relationship
between debt maturity and growth opportunities. In this regard, Dang
(2011) studied the interaction between debt maturity, leverage and
growth opportunities. His findings support the liquidity risk
proposition over the underinvestment problem through depicting a
positive relationship between debt maturity and leverage.
On the basis of the literature reviewed, this study strives to
determine a tradeoff between liquidity risk and agency cost of
underinvestment problem or debt overhung in a developing market
like Pakistan. The research hypothesis has been given in the next
section.
Research Hypotheses
According to Myers’ (1977) underinvestment hypothesis,
H1: Increase in Growth opportunities negatively affect the level of
financial leverage employed by a firm.
H2: Increase in Growth opportunities negatively affect the level of
long term debt employed by a firm.
The two hypotheses given above describe the substitution
effect of short term loans and reduced leverage as a solution to the
underinvestment problem. Furthermore these hypotheses also strive
to determine the liquidity risk exposure of the firms understudy.
The underinvestment proposition also hypothesizes a
negative relationship between debt maturity structure and leverage.
However the liquidity risk hypothesis proposed by Diamond (1991,
1993) and Sharpe (1991) predicts the relationship to be positive. These
conflicting expectations pertaining to the relationship between debt
maturity and leverage indicate a tradeoff between liquidity risk and
underinvestment problem by firms. The hypothesis is given as,
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H3: There is a significant relationship between debt maturity and
leverage.
Moreover those firms which employ short termed debt for
acquiring underinvestment incentives tend to be less inclined towards
decreasing leverage. Hence it can be hypothesized that,
H4: The increased use of short term debt weakens the relationship
between growth opportunities and leverage
Similarly those firms that strive to resolve underinvestment
problems using low leverage tend to have less incentive to use short
term debt. Hence it can be hypothesized that,
H5: The use of low leverage weakens the relationship between
growth opportunities and short term debt maturity.
For testing these research hypotheses, in the next section a detail
description of data collected and methodology employed has been
presented.
Methodology
This study employs a sample of 105 companies from the Textile
sector of Pakistan over a sample time period extending from 2004 to
2011. The literature reports that the firms in the same industry follow
similar financing patterns and demonstrate same financing needs
(Bradley, Larrel & Kem, 1984; Almazan & Molina, 2005). Moreover
every industry tends to have an optimal capital structure and debt
maturity preferences depending upon the inherent business risk faced
by firms in that industry.
Simultaneous Equations Model
On the basis of the past literature reviewed and the research
hypotheses developed in section 3, the issue of simultaneity can be
viewed in the interaction between debt maturity and leverage.
Therefore in this study a system of simultaneous equations has been
employed.
ܮ݁ݒ݅ ,ݐ = ߙ݋ + ߜܮ݁ݒܮ݁ݒ݅ ,ݐ−1 + ߙ1ܯܽݐ݅ ,ݐ + ߙ2ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ݅ ,ݐ + ߙ3ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎxܯܽݐ݅ ,ݐ + ݔ݅ ,ݐܮ݁ݒߚܮ݁ݒ + ݑ݅,ݐ  
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Leverage Equation
The hypothesized relationship developed on the basis of the
literature reviewed has been tested in this section using the
following leverage equation eq.1,
Leverage ( In relevance with Booth et al., (2001) and Shah &
Hijazi, (2004), in this study Leverage has been measured through
dividing total debt by market value of equity plus book value of debt.
In this study total debt includes both short term debt as well as the
long term debt due to the fact that in developing countries like Pakistan
the use of short term is more prevalent as compared to long term
financing (Booth et al., 2001). In addition Shah and Hijazi (2004) also
indicated that in Pakistan firms are more inclined towards using short
term financing due to small firm size and limited access to the capital
markets.
Lagged Leverage ( To control the effect of dynamic
adjustments towards a target leverage level as proposed by the trade
off theory of capital structure a lagged value of leverage denoted as
has been included in the leverage equation above (Ozkan,
2001; Flannery & Rangan, 2006). The term lagged leverage refers to
leverage values of the previous period (lagged t-1). The speed of
adjustment coefficient  is expected to have a positive sign.
Debt Maturity (  Debt Maturity is a ratio of long term debt due
in time more than one year to total debt. The coefficient of debt maturity
is expected to have a negative sign according to the underinvestment
hypothesis (Myers, 1977). However the liquidity risk hypothesis
proposes a positive sign (Diamond, 1991, 1993; Sharpe, 1991).
Growth Opportunities ( New investment
opportunities having potential to grow significantly are referred to as
Growth Opportunities for the firms and are measured through dividing
market value of equity plus the book value of debt by total assets.
According to the Myers (1977) underinvestment hypothesis, the
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coefficient of growth opportunities in the leverage equation is
expected to have a negative sign. Here the negative sign of the
coefficient indicates that as the growth opportunities increase the
firms tend to reduce leverage.
Interaction term between Growth Opportunities and Debt
Maturity ( Following the work of Johnson (2003)
this study has also incorporated an interaction term between growth
opportunities and debt maturity in the leverage equation. On the
basis of the underinvestment hypothesis, the coefficient of this
interaction term is expected to have a negative sign believing that
increased use of short term debt maturity strives to attenuate the
inverse relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. The
expectation of the negative coefficient can also be explained from a
perspective that the growing firms use less leverage due to high cost
of debt as compared to non growing firms (Titman &Wessels, 1988;
Barclay & Smith, 1995; Rajan & Zingales, 1995).
Control Variables In addition to the basic explanatory
variables, this study also includes four control variables including
Firm Size, Profitability, Tangibility and Non- debt Tax Shield.
Firm Size: Sizeis given as a natural log of total assets.
According to Titman and Wessels (1988) the size coefficient must
have a positive sign as the large firms are highly financially leveraged
due to low bankruptcy, transaction and agency cost associated with
maintaining high level of debt. On the contrary, it is also noted that
the large firms are less vulnerable to asymmetric information which
reduces the chance of undervaluation of the firm’s new equity issues
and hence makes it easy for the firm to access capital markets and
raise equity capital. Therefore Rajan and Zingales (1995) proposed a
negative sign for the size coefficient.
Profitability: Profitability is given as a ratio of Earnings
before Interest and Tax to total assets. Therefore On the basis of the
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pecking order proposition in this study the profitability coefficient is
expected to have a negative sign (Myers and Majluf 1984). However
on the basis of the tradeoff framework the profitability coefficient can
also have a positive sign (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Jensen &
Meckling, 1986).
Tangibility:Tangibility is given as a ratio of fixed assets to
total assets. The capital intensive nature of textile sector indicates
high level of fixed assets and high tangibility (Frank & Goyal, 2007).
Consequently a positive sign is expected on the coefficient of
tangibility in the leverage equation.
Non- debt Tax Shield (NDTS):NDTS is given as a ratio of
annual depreciation charges to total assets. Following the work of De
Angelo and Masulis (1980), Bradley et al. (1984), this study also expects
a negative sign on the coefficient of NDTS in the leverage equation.
Debt Maturity Equation
The hypothesized relationships pertaining to debt maturity are
empirically tested using the equation given below in eq.2,
Debt Maturity (It serves as a dependent variable in the
debt maturity eq.2.
Lag of Debt Maturity (First lag of debt maturity is included in
order to account for the dynamics of the debt maturity (Barclay&
Smith, 1995; Ozkan, 2000; Brick & Ravid, 1985; Kane et al., 1985; Jun &
Jen, 2003; Antoniou et al., 2006).
Leverage (:Here in the debt maturity equation leverage enters
as an explanatory variable and carry the same expectations pertaining
to the sign of the coefficient as debt maturity in the leverage equation.
ܯܽݐ݅,ݐ = ߛ݋ + ߜܯܽݐܯܽݐ݅,ݐ−1 + ߛ1ܮ݁ݒ݅ ,ݐ + ߛ2ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ݅ ,ݐ + ߛ3ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎxܮ݁ݒ݅ ,ݐ + ݔ݅ ,ݐܯܽݐ ߚܯܽݐ + ݒ݅ ,ݐ  
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Growth OpportunitiesAs mentioned earlier  the
underinvestment hypothesis proposes a negative coefficient on
growth opportunities where as the liquidity risk hypothesis proposes
a positive sign.
Interaction term between Growth Opportunities and
Leverage This interaction term strives to analyze the role of leverage
in attenuating the negative relationship between growth opportunities
and debt maturity. Its coefficient is expected to have a negative sign.
Control Variables (Six control variables have been
introduced including firm size, Asset term structure, Tax, Term
structure, Volatility and Firm Quality.
Firm Size: firm size is expected to have the same coefficients
as in the leverage equation.
Asset Maturity Structure (ASSETMS): Asset Maturity
Structure is given as a ratio of net property, plant and equipment to
depreciation expense. Under the maturity matching proposition a
positive sign is expected on the coefficient of the Asset Maturity
Structure in the debt maturity equation (Hart & Moore, 1994; Stohs &
Mauer, 1996).
Tax: Tax is given as a ratio of total tax charge to earnings
before tax. Its coefficient is expected to have a positive sign.
Term Structure of interest rates: Term structure is measured
as a difference between ten year government bonds and three months
treasury bills expecting a positive sign on its coefficient.
Volatility: Volatility is given as an average of the annual %
change in the operating profit (Earnings before Interest depreciation
and tax). A positive coefficient is expected on the volatility in the debt
maturity equation.
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Firm Quality: Firm Quality is measured through the ability
of the firm to make abnormal profits. Here the abnormal profits refer to
those profits that exceed the normal profits a firm must make to sustain
its normal operations. Quality is given as difference between EPS at
time t and EPS at time t-1 to share price at time t-1.The negative sign of
the coefficient on firm quality is explained by the signaling hypothesis.
Method of estimating Simultaneous Equations
In this study in the leverage equation, debt maturity is endogenous
for which 8 instrumental variables have been incorporated in the
analysis including profitability, NDTS, size, Asset maturity structure,
term structure of interest rates, tangibility, growth opportunities and
interaction term between grow dummy and debt maturity (Aivazian et
al., 2005a,b). On the other hand, in the debt maturity equation
instrumental variables for leverage include tangibility, profitability,
NDTS, size, Asset maturity structure, term structure of interest rates,
tax, growth opportunities, firm quality and interaction term between
growth dummy and leverage. Furthermore in order to generate more
efficient results a two-step GMM estimation procedure has also been
employed in this study which works under the assumption of no serial
correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Empirical Results
In this section empirical results of the study have been discussed in
detail.
The significant positive coefficient of the lagged leverage
term indicates a support to the proposition of the trade off theory of
capital structure and the dynamic specifications of leverage in the
Textile sector of Pakistan. Almost 68% (1-0.32) of the deviation from
the target leverage is closed in a year’s time as demonstrated by the
empirical results of both 2SLS and GMM procedure.
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Dependent Variable: Leverage  
Independent Variables Expected 
sign 
2SLS GMM 
D(Levt-1) + 0.328043*** 0.328043*** 
Matit +/- 0.673798*** 0.673798*** 
Growtht - -0.037676 -0.037676 
Growth *Maturityt - -0.315186*** -0.315186*** 
Tangibilityt + -0.259434*** -0.259434*** 
Profitabilityt +/- -0.351812*** -0.351812*** 
NDTS(t) - 0.095347 0.095347 
Sizet +/- -0.033494*** -0.033494*** 
R-squared   0.048941 0.048941 
***Significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
le 1 below, contains the summarized results of both 2SLS as well as
GMM estimation procedure for leverage equation.
Table 1:
Leverage Equation
The coefficient on the debt maturity is also reported to be
positive and significant at 1% indicating a direct positive relationship
between debt maturity and leverage and leads towards the acceptance
of hypothesis 3 supporting the liquidity risk proposition. These
empirical findings are coherent with the fact that the textile sector of
Pakistan is capital intensive which allows the firms to acquire long
term debt against its fixed assets and heavy machinery. Therefore
increased use of long term debt reduces the liquidity risk of these
firms and enabling them to acquire more debt. These findings are
aligned with those of Johnson (2003), Barclay et al., (2003), Elyasiani
et al, (2002), Diamond (1991, 1993) and Childs et al., (2005).
Moreover the coefficient of growth opportunities in the
leverage equation is negative yet insignificant representing that the
increase in growth opportunities for the textile firms in Pakistan does
not force the firms to reduce the level of leverage. This can be
attributable to the capital intensive nature of the textile sector as well
as to the limited growth prospects in the turbulent markets of Pakistan.
Hence the empirical findings do not support the underinvestment
hypothesis.
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The coefficient on the interaction term between growth and
debt maturity in the leverage equation is negative and significant
depicting a negative effect of interaction term on leverage. In non
growing firms one unit increase in debt maturity brings 0.67 units
increase in leverage however in case of growing firms leverage increase
by only 0.36 units. This indicates that the overall positive relationship
between debt maturity and leverage is weak for growing firms during
high growth phases. During the high growth phases the growing
firms tend avoid using high level of leverage in order as it can expose
the growing firms to underinvestment problem or a situation of debt
overhung.
On the contrary incase of non growing firms the positive
relationship between debt maturity and leverage is strong due to the
fact that for non growing firm liquidity risk takes preference over
underinvestment hypothesis. Hence the non growing firms use long
term debt which reduces the liquidity risk and allows these firms to
use more leverage. Here it can also be concluded for growing textile
firms in Pakistan the underinvestment problem outweighs liquidity
risk but for non growing firms liquidity risk plays a pivotal role in
determining the financing policy of a firm.
Among control variables the coefficient on size, tangibility
ad profitability are found to be significant at 1% whereas coefficient
of NDTS is insignificant. The coefficient on tangibility is although
significant yet it carries a negative sign which is against the
expectations. The negative relationship between tangibility and
leverage can be explained on the basis of the fact that most of the
firms in the textile sector of Pakistan are family owned which indicates
that most of the fixed assets are financed by internal equity rather
than external financing.
Moreover the coefficient on profitability is also found out to
be significant with a negative sign supporting the pecking order
proposition. The negative sign predicts that the profitable textile firms
prefer using internally generated funds over acquiring more leverage.
These results are also aligned with those of Myers and Majluf (1984).
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The coefficient on size is also significant with a negative
sign. This negative sign on the size coefficient is aligned with the
study of Rajan and Zingales (1995). This negative relationship is
attributable to the fact that most of the large textile companies are
fairly owned which indicates an easy access to equity capital rather
than debt financing. Moreover according to Rajan and Zingales (1995)
new equity issue is also not a big problem for large firms which also
support the negative sign on the size coefficient in the leverage
equation.
The R-squre value for both the GMM and 2SLS estimation
procedures is reported to be 0.048 which indicates that only 4 percent
change in the firm’s leverage level is explained by the specified
independent variables in the model. The R-square value is although
quite low however it is aligned with the results reported by Datta et
al., (2005).
The next subsection aims at elaborating the results of debt
maturity equation.
Table 2 below contains the empirical findings of debt maturity
equation.
 
Dependent variable: Debt Maturity  
Independent variable Expected 
sign 
2SLS GMM 
Matt-1 + 0.562853*** 0.562853*** 
Levt +/- 0.71084*** 0.71084*** 
Growtht - 0.123972*** 0.123972*** 
Growth * Levt - -0.019051 -0.019051 
Asset MSt + 2.31E-05 0.8156 
Term Structuret + -3.004612*** -3.004612*** 
Firm Qualityt - 0.000474 0.000474 
Tax +/- 0.001355 0.001355 
Volatilityt + 0.000195 0.000195 
Sizet +/- 0.011198* 0.011198* 
R-squared   0.286508 0.286508 
***Significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
Table 2:
Debt Maturity Equation
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW JULY 2016
Research
416
Liquidity Risk Vs. Underinvestment Problem
The coefficient on the lagged debt maturity is reported to be
significant and positive. These findings are consistent with the
literature (Jun & Jen, 2003; Ozkan, 2000; Antoniou et al., 2006). This
indicates that the debt maturity structure in textile sector of Pakistan
has an optimal value towards which the firms strive to adjust their
current debt maturity structure in the long run.
The coefficient on leverage in the debt maturity equation is
positive and significant at 1%. This indicates a direct positive
relationship between debt maturity and leverage. These results are
also consistent with the positive relationship reported in the leverage
equation. This positive sign on the leverage coefficient declares the
supremacy of liquidity risk over the underinvestment problem in the
textile sector of Pakistan. Here it can be inferred that in the textile
sector of Pakistan, firms use long term debt as a tool to avoid a chance
of bankruptcy due to high leverage. These findings are consistent
with the previous literature (Stohs & Mauer, 1996; Antoniou et al.,
2006, Elyasiani, et al., 2002).
Furthermore in the debt maturity equation the coefficient on
growth opportunities is significant at 1% with a negative sign as
proposed by the underinvestment hypothesis. These empirical results
prove the hypothesis 2 true. The negative relationship between growth
opportunities and debt maturity implies that the textile firms in Pakistan
prefer to resolve the underinvestment problem during the era of high
growth through shortening the debt maturity structure. This finding
is aligned with Myers (1977) underinvestment proposition. Additionally
the significant negative relationship between debt maturity and growth
opportunities also strives to provide a logical explanation of the
insignificant relationship between growth opportunities and leverage
in eq.1. Linking the empirical findings of eq.1 and eq.2, it can be inferred
that the textile firms n Pakistan when exposed to high growth
opportunities prefer resolving the underinvestment problem through
shortening the debt maturity rather than reducing leverage.
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The coefficient on the interaction term between leverage and
growth opportunities is although negative as expected yet it is
insignificant. Here it can be inferred that the textile firms in Pakistan do
not opt for resolving the underinvestment problem through reducing
the level of leverage.
Looking at the control variables, it is reported that only term
structure of interest rates and size is significant. The coefficient of
term structure of interest rates is significant at 1%with a negative
sign. The coefficient on size is significant at 10% with a negative sign
indicating that the large textile firms use more equity financing rather
than external financing.
Conclusion
This study strives to test the interacting relationship between
debt maturity structure and the level of leverage employed by the
textile firms in Pakistan in the presence of growth opportunities.
The findings reveal that the non growing firms in the textile sector
of Pakistan are more concerned over liquidity risk than the
underinvestment problem. Therefore firms strive to use long term debt
which reduces liquidity risk and allows these non growing textile firms
to increase leverage. However in case of growing firms during the
times of high growth, reduce the leverage in order to avoid the
underinvestment problem. Furthermore it is also reported that these
textile firms survive the high growth phase through shortening the
debt maturity. Hence a possibly preferred tool for resolving the
underinvestment problem is short term debt maturity rather than
reducing leverage in the textile sector of Pakistan.
This study also provides a strong evidence of the positive
relationship between debt maturity and leverage, indicating that these
components of a financial strategy tend to complement each other in
moderating the liquidation risk rather than acting as substitutes to
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resolve the underinvestment problem. On the basis of the empirical
findings of the study it can be inferred that for textile firms in Pakistan
financial flexibility along with a low liquidity risk is more important
that the agency cost of underinvestment hypothesis. Hence
companies are reported to adopt a conservative financing policy.
In terms of future research implications of this study, it is
recommended that a similar study must also be conducted in sectors
other than the textile sector of Pakistan in order to understand the
debt structure of other sectors as well. This will also help in creating
a comparison of the debt structure prevailing in different industries
in Pakistan.
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